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The End of North Korea

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with Nato's original purpose. Yost argues that the allies "have little choice but to follow a two-track policy—pursuing collective security aspirations . . . while maintaining their collective defense posture and orientation." Collective defense persists as the only firm foundation for alliance cohesion and strength.

The abridgement of his thesis in the opening chapter is fully remedied in his last chapter, "Prospects and Challenges," in which he gives fuller expression to the logical end points of the analysis presented in the body of his work. For the researcher, the lack of a bibliography is a drawback, although full citations are offered in the endnotes. Yost might have enriched even more the depth and balance of his analysis by including more references to the many challenges Nato has faced and surmounted in its fifty-year history.

As a reference, this book offers a number of helpful features. Its four appendices contain the Nato Treaty, the Partnership for Peace framework, the founding act between Nato and the Russian Federation, and the charter of partnership between Nato and Ukraine. Two useful glossaries and a schematic help in clarifying and making understandable the many organizations and terms currently constituting the European security architecture. Two maps, contrasting the Euro-

Atlantic region in 1988 and in 1998, are also supplied.

Yost began his research for this book in 1996–97 as a fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; his work continued until the spring of 1998. Yost's analysis of the issues is given weight not only by his scholarship but also by the quantity and quality of his primary and secondary sources, and by the many interviews he conducted on both sides of the Atlantic.

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Eberstadt, Nicholas. *The End of North Korea*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999. 191pp. \$14.95

The End of North Korea provides a nuanced and accessible, if wordy, analysis of North Korea's economic situation and political behavior. Nicholas Eberstadt, a visiting scholar at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, has been watching North Korea for many years. He has written a timely book that will be of particular interest to the policy community.

One of his major themes is that politics decisively dominated economics in North Korea in the past

and continues to do so today. Historically, this is visible in North Korea's ambition to unify the Korean Peninsula under its domination, and in the development of a unique form of socialism and a self-reliant economy (*juche*). Eberstadt argues that until the late 1970s North Korea could reasonably think that an opportunity to unify the peninsula would come its way. South Korean economic growth did not take off until the mid-1960s, its politics were not stable until after 1979, and the U.S. commitment to its defense varied significantly. By the 1970s Kim Il Sung believed that after the unexpected failure of 1950, he had missed a chance to unify the peninsula in 1960; vowing to be ready next time, he tripled the size of the army and devoted much of the nation's resources to the military. The North Korean economy could not sustain this program of war mobilization without external support; the withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese aid in the early 1990s created a trade shock to which North Korea has not adjusted.

The economic collapse has precedents. Eberstadt examines North Korea's current economic situation by comparing it with the shorter but more intense mobilizations of the combatants in World War II; the trade shocks experienced by the American Confederacy, South Africa, Vietnam, Cuba, and Iraq;

and the famines early in the communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. In most cases, economic problems either were shorter in duration (war mobilization) or could be addressed by policy changes (trade shocks and famine).

What is different about North Korea is that its leadership has chosen not to make the policy adjustments that would generate economic growth and feed its people, for fear that economic changes would be politically fatal. Abandonment of the goals of unification and of North Korea's unique form of socialism, as well as exposure to the material incentives and contacts with the outside world that would attend economically rational development, would likely erode the political position of the North Korean leadership. Kim Jong Il has seen what happened to the Soviet Union when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to liberalize the Soviet economy and political system, and the stresses that have accompanied China's economic reforms. So the regime, in Eberstadt's words, "avoids two-sided trade relationships and encourages one-sided tribute relationships by exporting insecurity." The future may be worse: one of Eberstadt's most interesting arguments is that the economic stasis of the North and the dynamism of the South mean that the two economies will grow

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farther apart, thus increasing the difficulty and cost of their eventual integration. Eberstadt believes that Korea's situation will ultimately be better after unification, after which, he speculates in the last chapter, it will be peaceable, politically free, and market oriented. However, the author provides no warrant for this rosy prediction, and he does not consider alternative scenarios.

Can North Korean politics survive economic disintegration? This is a major question, because U.S. and South Korean policies seem to assume that the problem needs to be managed only until North Korea's imminent political collapse. Unfortunately, on this subject Eberstadt waffles, implying in the first five chapters that economic collapse does not necessarily cause political collapse but suggesting in the last chapter that it does. True, Eberstadt cannot consider reunification without presupposing collapse; however, without explicitly grappling with this question, he cannot address the title of his book. If states can endure economic collapse, Eberstadt has not made the case that the end of North Korea is in sight. Rather, we might expect that so long as the praetorians remain loyal, the economy will continue to muddle through, people will die of starvation, and the regime will remain in power. Failing a Gorbachev-like

miscalculation about political and economic reform by Kim Jong Il or his successors, North Korea may be exporting insecurity and importing tribute for years to come. Contrary to the title, the end of North Korea may not yet be at hand.

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Varner, Joe. *Canada's Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Maritime Affairs. NIOBE Papers, vol. 10, 1999. 80pp. (no price given)

Haydon, Peter T. *Navies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie Univ. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998. 97pp. \$10.50

Varner's *Canada's Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma* is a series of essays that discuss Canada's position in the rapidly developing post-Cold War order. It is also a call to the Canadian government to commit itself, through defense spending and diplomacy, to providing security for its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Varner begins by presenting a snapshot of world powers as a new order evolves, marked by dwindling Russian influence and shifting U.S. interests. Painting a bleak picture of escalating instability and growing military spending among smaller